Are fluctuations in firms' profitability risk a major cause of regular business cycles? We study this question within the framework of a heterogeneous-firm dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with fixed capital adjustment costs. In such a model, surprise increases of risk lead to a wait-and-see policy for investment at the firm level and a decrease in aggregate economic activity. We calibrate the model using German firm-level data with a broader sectoral, size and ownership coverage than comparable U.S. data sets. The use of these data enables us to provide robust lower and upper bound estimates for the size of firm-level risk fluctuations. We find that time-varying firm-level risk on its own is unlikely to be a major quantitative source of regular business cycle fluctuations. When we augment a model with only aggregate productivity shocks by time-varying risk, the risk shocks dampen the high contemporaneous correlations of the productivity-shock-only model, but do not alter the other unconditional business cycle properties. JEL Codes: E20, E22, E30, E32.
Introduction
Is time-varying firm-level profitability risk a major cause of regular business cycle fluctuations?
Shocks to firm risk have the appealing theoretical property that they can generate naturally bust-boom cycles, as shown in a seminal paper by Bloom (2009) . After a surprise increase in risk, firms, more uncertain about future profitability, will halt or slow down all activities that cannot be easily reversed, they wait and see. Investment in equipment and structures is an important example. After the heightened uncertainty is resolved, pent-up demand for capital goods leads to an investment boom. In this paper we evaluate this mechanism quantitatively.
We start from a heterogeneous-firm dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with persistent idiosyncratic productivity shocks and fixed capital adjustment costs. In such an environment, time-varying firm-level risk is naturally modeled as fluctuations in the variance of future firm-level productivity shocks. We develop the numerical tools to solve such a model in general equilibrium. The model features 'wait-and-see' when firm-level risk rises, because investment decisions cannot be reversed easily. The conditional effect of increases in firms' risk is thus a bust-boom cycle in aggregate economic activity. While important, conditional moments paint an incomplete picture of the business cycle. We study the unconditional business cycle implications of time-varying firm-level risk and compare them to the data and the business cycle properties of a model with aggregate productivity shocks only.
We use the Deutsche Bundesbank balance sheet data base of German firms, USTAN, to calibrate the model -in particular the capital adjustment costs and the idiosyncratic risk process. USTAN is a private sector, annual, firm-level data set that allows us to use 26 years of data , with cross-sections that have, on average, over 30,000 firms per year. USTAN has a broader ownership, size and industry coverage than the available comparable U.S. data sets from Compustat and the Annual Survey of Manufacturers. The richness of USTAN lets us take into account measurement error and sample selection issues. It also allows us to formulate lower and upper bound scenarios for the size of firm-level risk fluctuations.
We find that risk shocks alone do not produce recognizable business cycles. They generate only 15 per cent of the volatility of aggregate output, with investment and employment being too volatile relative to output. They lead to negative correlations between aggregate consumption on the one hand and output, investment and employment on the other. We then introduce risk shocks as an independent process alongside standard aggregate productivity shocks. In such an environment, risk shocks help to dampen the notoriously too high contemporaneous correlations in the productivity-shocks-only model. Otherwise the business cycle properties are unaltered. Moreover, the conditional impulse responses to surprise increases in firm-level risk are inconsistent with at least the point estimates of their data counterparts. This can be amended by allowing for correlation between aggregate productivity and firm-level risk and then feeding their joint dynamics into the model. In this case, firm-level risk shocks contribute substantially to aggregate fluctuations. Yet, when we isolate the contribution of the 'wait-andsee' effect to these fluctuations, we find that it is again small.
We also show that including time-varying aggregate risk has negligible effects since the average level of idiosyncratic risk is estimated to be an order of magnitude larger than aggregate risk. Relative to the large average idiosyncratic risk that firms face, even the sizeable fluctuations of aggregate risk in the data, with a percentage volatility between 30 and 40 per cent, have a negligible impact on the total risk in firms' future profitability and hence also negligible effects on firms' optimal policies.
There is now a growing literature arguing that various measures of firm-level risk both across countries and across data sources, e.g. balance sheet and survey data, are unconditionally countercyclical. 1 While interesting and pervasive, these facts do not, however, directly speak to the question whether risk fluctuations generate regular business cycle fluctuations. Some authors have tackled this question using structural VARs and (linearized) DSGE models. In Christiano et al. (2009) , a DSGE estimation exercise, risk shocks have a low frequency and a rather small business cycle impact. This is similar to the SVAR findings in Bachmann, Elstner and Sims (2010), who use business survey data to measure firms' risk. They also argue that observed risk increases might be systematic reactions to first-moment shocks, rather than autonomous drivers of the business cycle.
Our approach, by contrast, is to quantitatively evaluate the 'wait-and-see' effect caused by capital adjustment frictions. We thus build on the literature that highlights physical frictions as a propagation mechanism for risk shocks: Bernanke (1983) , Dixit and Pindyck (1994) estimates a rich heterogeneous firm model that features the 'wait-and-see' effect in partial equilibrium. Bloom et al. (2010) show that this conditional effect survives general equilibrium price movements. Schaal (2010) uses a directed search model with uncertainty shocks to understand the labor market in the so-called Great Recession. 2 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the model. Section 3 describes its calibration and Sections 4 and 5 discuss the results. Appendices provide details on the data as well as the robustness of the calibration and the simulation results. Gourio (2010) . There is also a literature that studies low frequency movements in both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk, see Davis et al. (2006) as well as Carvalho and Gabaix (2010 
Firms
The economy consists of a unit mass of small firms. There is one commodity in the economy that can be consumed or invested. Each firm produces this commodity, employing its predetermined capital stock (k) and labor (n), according to the following Cobb-Douglas decreasingreturns-to-scale production function (θ > 0, ν > 0, θ + ν < 1):
where z and denote aggregate and idiosyncratic revenue productivity, respectively.
The idiosyncratic log productivity process is first-order Markov with autocorrelation ρ and time-varying conditional standard deviation, σ( ). Idiosyncratic productivity shocks are otherwise independent from aggregate shocks. The aggregate log productivity process is an AR (1) with autocorrelation ρ z and time-varying conditional standard deviation, σ(z ). Idiosyncratic productivity shocks are independent across productive units. The processes for σ( )−σ( ) and σ(z ) −σ(z) are also modeled as AR(1) processes, whereσ( ) denotes the time-average of idiosyncratic risk andσ(z) the same for aggregate risk.
We denote the trend growth rate of aggregate productivity by (1 − θ)(γ − 1), so that aggregate output and capital grow at rate γ − 1 along the balanced growth path. From now on we work with k and y (and later aggregate consumption, C ) in efficiency units. 3 In Table 10 in Appendix B we explore a timing assumption, where firms today know only today's standard deviations, but predict tomorrow's using persistence in the process for the standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
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Each period a firm draws its current cost of capital adjustment, ξ ≤ ξ ≤ξ, which is denominated in units of labor, from a time-invariant distribution, G. G is a uniform distribution on [ξ,ξ], common to all firms. Draws are independent across firms and over time, and employment is freely adjustable.
Upon investment, i , the firm incurs a fixed cost of ωξ, where ω is the current real wage.
Capital depreciates at a rate δ. We can then summarize the evolution of the firm's capital stock (in efficiency units) between two consecutive periods, from k to k , as follows:
Fixed cost paid γk
Given the i.i.d. nature of the adjustment costs, it is sufficient to describe differences across firms and their evolution by the distribution of firms over ( , k). We denote this distribution by µ. Thus, z, σ(z ), σ( ), µ constitutes the current aggregate state and µ evolves according to the law of motion µ = Γ z, σ(z ), σ( ), µ , which firms take as given.
To summarize: at the beginning of a period, a firm is characterized by its pre-determined capital stock, its idiosyncratic productivity, and its capital adjustment cost. Given the aggregate state, it decides its employment level, n, production and depreciation occurs, workers are paid, and investment decisions are made. Then the period ends.
Next we describe the dynamic programming problem of a firm. We will take two shortcuts (details can be found in Khan and Thomas, 2008) . We state the problem in terms of utils of the representative household (rather than physical units), and denote the marginal utility of consumption by p = p z, σ(z ), σ( ), µ . Also, given the i.i.d. nature of the adjustment costs, continuation values can be expressed without future adjustment costs.
Let V 1 , k, ξ; z, σ(z ), σ( ), µ denote the expected discounted value -in utils -of a firm that is in idiosyncratic state ( , k, ξ), given the aggregate state z, σ(z ), σ( ), µ . Then the firm's expected value prior to the realization of the adjustment cost draw is given by:
With this notation the dynamic programming problem becomes:
where CF denotes the firm's flow value, V no adj the firm's continuation value if it chooses inaction and does not adjust, and V adj the continuation value, net of adjustment costs AC , if the firm 5 adjusts its capital stock. That is:
where both expectation operators average over next period's realizations of the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, conditional on this period's values, and we recall that i = γk
The discount factor, β, reflects the time preferences of the representative household.
Taking as given ω z, σ(z ), σ( ), µ and p z, σ(z ), σ( ), µ , and the law of motion
, the firm chooses optimally labor demand, whether to adjust its capital stock at the end of the period, and the optimal capital stock, conditional on adjustment. This leads to policy functions:
capital is pre-determined, the optimal employment decision is independent of the current adjustment cost draw.
Households
We assume a continuum of identical households that have access to a complete set of statecontingent claims. Hence, there is no heterogeneity across households. They own shares in the firms and are paid dividends. We do not need to model the household side in detail (see Khan and Thomas (2008) for that), we just use the first-order conditions that determine the equilibrium wage and the marginal utility of consumption.
Households have a standard felicity function in consumption and labor:
where C denotes consumption and N h the household's labor supply. Households maximize the expected present discounted value of the above felicity function. By definition we have:
and from the intratemporal first-order condition:
Recursive Equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy is a set of functions 
Household optimality:
Taking ω and p as given, the household's consumption and labor supply satisfy (6) and (7).
3. Commodity market clearing:
Labor market clearing:
where J (x) = 0, if x = 0 and 1, otherwise.
Model consistent dynamics:
The evolution of the cross-section that characterizes the econ-
, σ( ), µ and the exogenous processes for z, σ( ) as well as .
Conditions 1, 2, 3 and 4 define an equilibrium given Γ, while step 5 specifies the equilibrium condition for Γ.
Solution
It is well-known that (3) is not computable, because µ is infinite dimensional. We follow Smith (1997, 1998) and approximate the distribution, µ, by a finite set of its moments, and its evolution, Γ, by a simple log-linear rule. As usual, we include aggregate capital holdings,k.
We also find that it improves the fit of the Krusell-Smith-rules to add the standard deviation of the natural logarithm of idiosyncratic productivity, st d (log( )). This is of course owing to the now time-varying nature of the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity. In the same vein, we approximate the equilibrium pricing function by a log-linear rule, discrete aggregate state by discrete aggregate state:
Given (7), we do not have to specify an equilibrium rule for the real wage. We posit the log-linear forms (8a)-(8b) and check that in equilibrium they yield a good fit to the actual law of motion.
The R 2 for capital in our baseline calibration are all above 0.999. For the marginal utility of consumption they exceed 0.995. 
Standard Parameters
The model period is a year. This corresponds to the data frequency in USTAN. Most firmlevel data sets that are based on balance sheet data are of that frequency. The following parameters then have standard values: β = 0.98 and δ = 0.094, which we compute from German national accounting data (VGR) for the nonfinancial private business sector. Given this depreciation rate, we pick γ = 1.014, in order to match the time-average aggregate investment rate in the nonfinancial private business sector: 0.108. γ = 1.014 is also consistent with German longrun growth rates. The disutility of work parameter, A, is chosen to generate an average time spent at work of 0.33: A = 2. We set the output elasticities of labor and capital to ν = 0.5565 and θ = 0.2075, respectively, which correspond to the measured median labor and capital shares in manufacturing in the USTAN data base. 7 We measure the steady state standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity shocks asσ( ) = 0.0905. In the calculation of this number we take measurement error and 2-digit industry-year effects as well as firm-level fixed effects in Solow residual growth rates into account. 8 Since idiosyncratic productivity shocks in the data also exhibit above-Gaussian kurtosis -4.4480 on 6 Davis et al. (2006) show that studying only publicly traded firms (Compustat) can lead to wrong conclusions, when cross-sectional dispersion is concerned. Also, just under half of our firms are from manufacturing. We focus instead on the nonfinancial private business sector. Specifically, we include firms that are in one of the following six 1-digit industries: agriculture, mining and energy, manufacturing, construction, trade, transportation and communication. For details on the data set and the calculation of σ( ) in the data, see Appendix A as well as Bachmann and Bayer (2011). An additional advantage of these data is easy access: while on-site, it is otherwise practically unrestricted for researchers, so that results derived from this data base can be easily checked. 7 If one views the DRTS assumption as a mere stand-in for a CRTS production function with monopolistic competition, than these choices would correspond to an employment elasticity of the underlying production function of 0.7284 and a markup of (2006), using LRD manufacturing data, estimate this parameter to be 0.592; Henessy and Whited (2005) , using Compustat data, find 0.551. We have experimented with both elasticities within conventional ranges, but have not found any of our main results to depend on them. Simulation results are available on request. 8 See Appendix A for details. Removing fixed effects here serves two purposes. First, it removes differences in idiosyncratic productivity growth that are predictable for the firm. Second, it homogenizes the sample in the sense that we can read these numbers as if the sample composition was fixed. Appendix A also deals with sample selection issues.
9 average -, and since the fixed adjustment costs parameters will be identified by the kurtosis of the firm-level investment rate (together with its skewness), we want to avoid attributing excess kurtosis in the firm-level investment rate to lumpy investment, when the idiosyncratic driving force itself has excess kurtosis. We incorporate the measured excess kurtosis into the discretization process for the idiosyncratic productivity state by using a mixture of two Gaussian distribu- In what follows, we describe our baseline choices for the parameters that characterize the aggregate shock processes and adjustment costs. In Section 5 as well as Appendix B we discuss how our model behaves under various alternative choices for these parameters.
Aggregate Shocks
In the baseline case we abstract from time-varying aggregate risk and correlation between aggregate productivity and idiosyncratic risk. Both themes will be taken up in Section 5. Thus, to compute ρ z andσ(z), we estimate an AR (1) 9 This process is discretized on a 5−state grid, using
Tauchen's (1986) procedure.
We also estimate an AR(1)-process for the linearly detrended cross-sectional standard deviation of the first differences of the natural logarithm of firm-level Solow residuals. This leads to ρ σ( ) = 0.5800 and σ σ( ) = 0.0037. 10 Again, this process is discretized on a 5−state grid, using Tauchen's (1986) procedure. This finer discretization compared to a two-state one has the advantage that we do not need to define the high-risk state as a certain multiple of the size of the low-risk state, in order to match the overall volatility of firm-level risk. We do not want to take a stand on how 'catastrophic', i.e. strong but rare, a risk shock is. Instead, we opt for assuming normality of risk shocks, which is supported by the data. Both a Shapiro-Wilk-test and a JarqueBera-test do not reject at conventional levels. In fact, Bloom et al. (2010) show that catastrophic risk events such as a doubling of firm-level risk has not occurred in U.S. post war data, and we do not find it in German data, either.
11 9 Without taking out the fixed effects in the cross-section these numbers would be, respectively, ρ z = 0.7209 andσ(z) = 0.0147. In Table 11 in Appendix B we report results, where we use an AR(1) based on aggregate Solow residuals calculated from national accounting data. They are basically the same as our baseline results. 10 Without the fixed effects these numbers would be, respectively, ρ σ( ) = 0.5710 and σ σ( ) = 0.0037. 11 Figure 5 in Appendix A.2 shows the time path of firm-level risk and average productivity.
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To gauge the importance of shocks to firm-level risk for aggregate fluctuations we use its time series coefficient of variation, which for our baseline case equals: CV r i sk = 4.72%. We will show below that the business cycle relevance of firm-level risk shocks is essentially an increasing function of this statistic.
Pinning down the value of CV r i sk from firm-level data is invariably laden with assumptions and decisions during the data treatment process. We view our baseline number for CV r i sk as a middle case. In order to assess how our results depend on CV r i sk , we consider two additional scenarios: a 'Lower Bound' scenario, where we halve CV r i sk , and an 'Upper Bound' scenario,
where CV r i sk is quadrupled. The 'Lower Bound' scenario corresponds roughly to a case where we do not eliminate fixed effects nor measurement error and focus only on the smallest 25 percent of firms (CV r i sk = 1.97%). The idea behind this scenario is to stay as close as possible to the raw data, using minimal assumptions, and to compensate, albeit somewhat crudely, for the unavoidable overrepresentation of large firms even in USTAN. To compute the 'Upper Bound' scenario we take again measurement error and a full set of fixed effects in Solow residual growth rates into account and capital-weight the cross-sectional standard deviation of firm-level Solow residual shocks. This is to give more importance to large firms, which roughly doubles the baseline CV r i sk to 8.38%. To be conservative, we double this again and use four times the baseline CV r i sk as the 'Upper Bound' scenario. We show in Section 5.3 that these bounds also cover the available U.S. numbers.
Adjustment Costs
In our baseline specification, we set the lower bound of the adjustment cost distribution, ξ, to zero. Given the aforementioned set of parameters
we calibrate the remaining adjustment costs parameter,ξ, to minimize a quadratic form in the normalized differences between the time-average firm-level investment rate skewness produced by the model and the data, as well as the time-average firm-level investment rate kurtosis:
As can be seen from (9), the distribution of firm-level investment rates exhibits both substantial positive skewness -2.1920 -as well as excess kurtosis -20.0355. Caballero et al. (1995) doc-ument a similar fact for U.S. manufacturing plants. They also argue that non-convex capital adjustment costs are an important ingredient to explain such a strongly non-Gaussian distribution, given a close-to-Gaussian firm-level shock process. With fixed adjustment costs, firms have an incentive to lump their investment activity together over time in order to economize on these adjustment costs. Therefore, typical capital adjustments are large, which creates excess kurtosis. Making use of depreciation, firms can adjust their capital stock downward without paying adjustment costs. This makes negative investments less likely and hence leads to positive skewness in firm-level investment rates. We therefore use the skewness and kurtosis of firm-level investment rates to identifyξ.
The following Table 1 shows thatξ is indeed identified in this calibration strategy, as crosssectional skewness and kurtosis of the firm-level investment rates are both monotonically increasing inξ. The minimum of Ψ is achieved forξ = 0.25, which constitutes our baseline case. 13 This implies average costs conditional on adjustment equivalent to roughly 7% of annual firmlevel value added, which is well in line with estimates from the U.S. (see Bloom (2009) , Table IV, for an overview). Notes: 'BL' denotes the baseline calibration. Skewness and kurtosis refer to the time-average of the corresponding cross-sectional moments of firm-level investment rates. The fourth column displays the value of Ψ in (9). The last column shows the average adjustment costs conditional on adjustment as a fraction of the firm's annual output.
13 Table 12 in Appendix B shows results where we quadruple the adjustment costs,ξ = 1. This is to give firms more of a wait-and-see motive. Table 13 in Appendix B shows results for the case ξ =ξ. Our baseline specification has stochastic adjustment costs, but their uncertainty does not change over time. This may reduce the time-varying 'wait-and-see' effect. We check this, by making adjustment costs deterministic in this alternative specification.
Baseline Results
With this set-up we can now answer our initial question concerning the importance of risk shocks as drivers of the business cycles. We do so in two steps. First, we study a model with only risk shocks ('Risk Model'). Then we add risk shocks as an independent process alongside standard aggregate productivity shocks ('Full Model').
Risk Model
Partial equilibrium models feature 'wait-and-see' dynamics as their conditional response to a risk shock: a collapse of economic activity on impact, then a strong rebound and overshooting (Bloom, 2009 ). We confirm in Figure 1 that this characteristic impulse response survives general equilibrium real interest rate and wage adjustments. In fact, the initial investment collapse is somewhat stronger in general equilibrium due to the usual wealth effect. Households perceive the prolonged rebound and overshooting of economic activity in the future, are wealthier and increase consumption of goods and leisure today. Less output is produced, more of it consumed and investment decreases. The rebound is weaker in general equilibrium due to consumption smoothing. Notes: impulse responses are computed by increasing σ( ) by one standard deviation and letting it return to its steady state value, according to the AR(1) process estimated in Section 3. 'GE' stands for general equilibrium and takes real wage and interest rate movements into account. 'PE' stands for partial equilibrium and fixes the real wage and the interest rate at its steady state level.
To answer our initial question and to understand the importance of time-varying risk for the business cycle, however, conditional responses are not sufficient. Table 2 displays the uncondi- 
Full Model
We next ask whether and how exogenous fluctuations in firm-level risk alter the business cycle dynamics of a standard RBC model with fixed capital adjustment costs, when they are added as a second independent aggregate shock process. 15 Relative to its average, aggregate risk is thus more than seven times as variable as idiosyncratic risk. One might expect large aggregate effects from these risk fluctuations. The following Table 4 shows that this is not the case. The business cycle statistics of the 'Full Model' with time-varying aggregate and idiosyncratic risk are very similar to those from the 'Full Model' with time-varying idiosyncratic risk only, which are similar to those from the 'RBC Model'. Tables 2 and 3 . 'Full Model-AGGR-RISK' refers to a variant of the 'Full Model', where also σ(z ) varies over time. It is perfectly correlated with σ( ) and its time series coefficient of variation is 34.72%. 15 We use rolling window standard deviation estimates for the growth rates of aggregate output and employment in Germany and the U.S. The precise number is somewhat sensitive to the data frequency and window size usedhigher frequencies and larger window sizes tend to give lower coefficients of variation for aggregate volatility. 
A Model with Correlated Risk and Productivity Shocks
In the previous sections we have investigated the unconditional business cycle properties of models with risk shocks. In this Section we study the conditional responses of the model and the data to an innovation in firm-level risk.
We estimate three-variable VARs with the cross-sectional average of the natural logarithm of firm-level Solow residuals, idiosyncratic risk and various aggregate activity variables. This ordering is then used in a simple Choleski-"identification", which is, obviously, not meant to have a structural interpretation. It is rather a different, but convenient and instructive way to summarize the data, albeit, given the annual frequency of the data and thus relatively few data points, invariably with some imprecision. The impulse responses estimated on simulated model data are much closer to those in the data, however, when we allow for correlated risk and productivity processes and feed into the model the joint dynamics we estimate from the data for these two time series ('CORR-BL'). The impulse responses from simulated data now qualitatively match the shape of the impulse responses from actual data for all four macroeconomic quantities. 
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Years
Total Hours
Notes: impulse response functions from SVARs with the linearly detrended cross-sectional average of the natural logarithm of firm-level Solow residuals (ordered first), the linearly detrended idiosyncratic risk (ordered second) and HP(100)-filtered aggregate output/total hours (ordered third). The dotted lines reflect one standard deviation confidence bounds for the estimates on the data from 10,000 bootstrap replications. We employ a bias correction a la Kilian (1998) . Estimates from data are in red, estimates from simulated model data in blue ('Full Model-BL') and green ('CORR-BL'), respectively. 'CORR-BL' refers to a simulation, where there are two correlated aggregate shocks, This signalling effect -the coefficient of risk today on productivity tomorrow is negative (−1.4708) -has important general equilibrium implications. Figure 4 shows that without marketclearing real interest rates and wages, the investment response to a risk shock would be strongly negative. Since higher risk today forecasts lower productivity tomorrow, a general equilibrium wealth effect makes agents consume less and work more (the real wage declines both in the data and the model), which drives up output and -through a decrease in the real interest rateinvestment on impact. Tables 2 and 3 It is mostly volatilities and relative volatilities that are changed by introducing the second shock. Output fluctuates more, but these output fluctuations are dampened, when actual risk shocks hit the economy, the more so the more volatile risk is. The responsiveness of the economy to productivity shocks decreases in the overall volatility of risk shocks. In terms of relative volatilities, the more volatile actual risk, the less fluctuates aggregate investment and the more aggregate consumption. The correlation structure of aggregate quantities is the same across models, and the increase in persistence from the 'RBC Model' to a model with risk shocks is largely mechanical, as it is manifest already in the 'Naive Model'.
We summarize this section with our fourth result: the conditional impulse responses of aggregate quantities to a risk innovation in a model where risk and productivity shocks are uncorrelated are inconsistent with their data counterparts. A model with correlated risk and productivity shocks matches the data better in terms of conditional impulse responses and leads to a reduction
of the ability of productivity shocks to generate aggregate fluctuations.
Discussion
Are the firm-level risk processes in Germany and the U.S. comparable? 16 Table 6 : COMPARISON GERMANY -U.S. that focusing on manufacturing is likely to lead to an overestimation of firm-level risk fluctuations. The USTAN data set allows for a comparison of the extent of firm-level risk fluctuations across industries and our analysis demonstrates that manufacturing is different from services.
CV r i sk C ycl i c al i t y r i sk
The combined retail and wholesale trade sector, for example, features a similar volatility and cyclicality of risk as the overall USTAN data set (see Table 8 in Appendix A.1). The combined transportation and communication sector has somewhat higher risk volatility (albeit lower than manufacturing), but firm-level risk is essentially acyclical there. Restricting the analysis to manufacturing data is thus problematic and even more so in the U.S., where this industry has an even smaller share in aggregate production and employment than it has in Germany. Finally, Table 6 shows that the lower and upper bound scenarios we use -half and quadruple the CV r i sk of the baseline scenario -comfortably cover the available U.S. evidence.
Conclusion
This paper argues that shocks to firm-level risk, mediated through physical capital adjustment frictions, are unlikely to be major drivers of the business cycle. We arrive at this conclusion by studying a heterogeneous-firm dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with persistent idiosyncratic shocks, fixed capital adjustment costs and time-varying firm-level risk. We discipline the model using a rich German firm-level data set. The model features the 'wait-andsee' property for investment after surprise increases in firm-level risk that the recent literature has highlighted. We focus on the unconditional business cycle dynamics generated by firm- Although the sampling design -one's commercial bill being put up for discounting -does not lead to a perfectly representative selection of firms in a statistical sense, the coverage of the sample is very broad. USTAN covers incorporated firms as well as privately-owned companies.
Its industry coverage -while still somewhat biased towards manufacturing firms -includes the construction, the service as well as the primary sectors. The following Table 7 displays the industry coverage of our final baseline sample. While there remains a bias towards larger and financially healthier firms, the size coverage is still fairly broad: 31% of all firm-year observations in our final baseline sample have less than 20 employees and 57% have less than 50 employees. In terms of ownership structure, only 2%
of firm-year observations are from publicly traded firms, just under 60% from limited liability companies and just under 40% from private firms with fully liable partners. Finally, the Bundesbank itself frequently uses the USTAN data for its macroeconomic analyses and for crosschecking national accounting data. We take this as an indication that the bank considers the data as sufficiently representative and of high quality. This makes the USTAN data a suitable data source for the study of cross-sectional business cycle dynamics.
From the original USTAN data, we select only firms that report information on payroll, gross value added (before depreciation) and capital stocks. Moreover, we drop observations from East
German firms to avoid a break of the series in 1990. We deflate all but the capital and investment data by the implicit deflator for gross value added from the German national accounts.
Capital is deflated with one-digit industry-and capital-good specific investment good price deflators within a perpetual inventory method. Similarly, we recover the amount of labor inputs from wage bills (we calculate an average wage for cells of firms described by industry, year, firmsize, and region and then divide the payroll by this average), as information on the number of employees is only updated infrequently for some companies. Finally, the firm-level Solow residual is calculated from data on real gross value added and factor inputs.
We remove outliers according to the following procedure: we calculate log changes in real gross value added, the Solow residual, real capital and employment, as well as the firm-level investment rate and drop all observations where a change falls outside a three standard deviations interval around the year-specific mean. We also drop those firms for which we do not have 
A.2 The Measurement of Firm-Level Risk
A.2.1 Dispersion of Innovations in Measured Firm-Level Solow Residuals
We model fluctuations in idiosyncratic risk as fluctuations in the cross-sectional standard deviation of firm-specific innovations to Solow residuals. Our first step is thus to calculate firmspecific Solow residuals. In accordance with our model, we use the Cobb-Douglas production function from Section 2:
where i ,t is firm-specific and z t aggregate productivity. We assume that labor input n i ,t is immediately productive, whereas capital k i ,t is pre-determined and inherited from last period. We estimate the output elasticities of the production factors, ν and θ, as median shares of factor expenditures over gross value added within each industry. We use log-differences in the Solow residual to capture Solow residual innovations, as the persistence of firm-level Solow residuals is high, close to a unit root. Table 8 displays the cyclical properties of the cross-sectional standard deviation of measured Solow residual innovations for various ways of cutting the sample and treating the data. The first row of Table 8 , 'Raw data', is the baseline relative to which the other rows change.
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For the second row we remove firm fixed and industry-year effects from these first-difference variables to focus on idiosyncratic fluctuations that do not capture differences in industryspecific responses to aggregate shocks or permanent ex-ante firm heterogeneity. The small differences between the first and second row indicate that the raw data are indeed mostly driven by truly idiosyncratic shocks.
For a firm to be in our baseline sample, we required it to have at least five observations in first differences of payroll, gross value added and capital stocks. When we focus on firms that are in the data base for almost the entire time horizon, i.e. for twenty observations in first differences, the volatility of firm-level risk almost doubles. The reason for this is explained in the next two panels of Table 8 , which, respectively, analyze the time series properties of firm risk by firm-size and ownership. It is indeed large and publicly traded firms that display stronger risk fluctuations than smaller and privately owned ones. Since smaller firms seem to face weaker fluctuations in risk, 18 our baseline sample in which small firms are underrepresented (and indeed all data sets with an overrepresentation of large and or publicly traded firms) is likely to yield an overestimation of the true cyclical risk fluctuations.
The next to last panel tells a cautionary tale about relying exclusively on manufacturing data when measuring firm-level risk fluctuations. In services, firm-level risk is either less volatile than in manufacturing ('Trade') or not countercyclical ('Transportation and Communication').
Finally, in any Solow residual calculation that is based on a simple Cobb-Douglas production function with only labor and capital, there is the potential problem of attributing optimal changes in utilization, hours per worker or effort to random productivity changes and therefore of overstating (average) firm-level risk. Using ideas from Basu (1996) , we calculate the dispersion of the Solow residual innovations for those firms that keep the intensity of material usage constant between two periods, i.e. firms for which the fraction of material usage to sales does not change. One can see that the coefficient of variation goes up but it is still below the estimate for large firms.
In the reminder of this subsection, we check whether the particular sample selection of the USTAN data has any impact on our findings. Clementi and Palazzo (2010) show in a structural model with firm entry and exit that selection on productivity would produce procyclical measured risk fluctuations in an actually homoskedastic world. This result provides some indication that our findings are not driven by selection on productivity. The econometric evidence confirms this.
The sample consists of those firms whose bills of exchange were put up for discounting at the Bundesbank. These are likely to be financially healthier and more productive than the average firm. However, this implies a bias for our results only if the level of productivity or financial health predicts productivity changes. To asses whether such a bias is present, we estimate the following simple Heckman (1976)-selection model with a maximum likelihood estimator for each year t = 1973, . . . , 1998. We take all firms present in t − 1 and observe the estimated level of the Solow residualˆ i ,t −1 . We assume that the selection to remain in the sample at time t is based on a latent variable ϑ i ,t composed of current productivity α i ,t and some normally distributed noise term u i ,t .
Moreover, we assume that productivity follows a random walk whose increments ∆ i ,t = v i ,t will be correlated with the composed error term of the selection equation, η i ,t = u i ,t + αv i ,t . We 18 Bachmann and Bayer (2011) show that they have higher average risk.
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assume that v i ,t is orthogonal to i ,t −1 . Let m t be the expected growth rate of i ,t , then:
A (latent) random walk fulfils the exclusion restriction necessary to use the Heckman estimator with i ,t −1 being independent of the innovation v i ,t and thus a valid instrument for selection. It is indeed more likely for the firm to remain in the sample with higher levels of i ,t −1 . However, this does not influence the estimated variance of
Its correlation with the sample variance st d (∆ log i ,t ) is almost perfect and the cyclical properties ofσ M L v (t ) are almost identical to those of st d (∆ log i ,t ), namely: CV = 2.63% vs. CV = 2.67% and a cyclicality of −0.44 versus −0.48. 19 We conclude that, although the sample is clearly no random sample with respect to productivity levels, it is sufficiently random with respect to productivity changes.
A.2.2 Dealing with Measurement Error
Measured Solow residuals will reflect true firm productivity only with error. We take this into account and assume that measured Solow residualsˆ i ,t are composed of the true productivity i ,t that follows a random walk and a white-noise error term u i ,t . We assume that u i ,t has a timeconstant variance σ 
by estimating σ 2 u from the sample analoguesŝ 1 andŝ 2 of s 1 and s 2 , averaging over time:
{[ŝ 1 (t ) +ŝ 1 (t + 1)] −ŝ 2 (t )} . 19 We used the case with industry and firm fixed effects removed for this analysis. This estimated measurement error is then subtracted from the variance of measured Solow residualsŝ 1 (t ) in order to obtain an estimate of the variance of productivity innovations:
We take (10) as our measure of firm-level risk, which is depicted in Figure 5 below, together with average firm-level productivity and aggregate output. Notes: the first column displays the time series coefficient of variation of the cross-sectional standard deviation of firm-specific Solow residual growth purged of measurement error ('ME') and firm-specific as well as industry-year fixed effects ('FE'): firm-level risk. The second column displays the time series correlation of firm-level risk with HP(100)-filtered GDP. Table 9 shows the cyclical properties of firm-level risk, i.e. the innovations of the Solow residual purged of measurement error. The first row represents our baseline calibration. We base our lower bound calibration scenario loosely on the second row, which displays the cyclical properties of firm-level risk for small firms, which are underrepresented in USTAN, and using the raw data, which are based on a minimum amount of assumptions. We base our upper bound calibration scenario loosely on the third row, which delivers the strongest risk fluctuations. To be conservative we roughly double this value when computing the upper bound models. Interestingly, combining features that increase risk fluctuations, such as 'being almost always in the sample' and 'being in manufacturing' (see Table 8 in the previous subsection), does not substantially increase the volatility of risk over and above what one of these features alone does (see the last row of Table 9 ). Any other combination would not have left sufficient data to yield reliable results. 
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B Appendix -Robustness
The following tables display results from simulations of our model for (i) a different timing assumption for when firms learn the dispersion of idiosyncratic shocks, (ii) aggregate productivity being calibrated from aggregate Solow residuals, (iii) a calibration with higher fixed costs of capital adjustment and (iv) a calibration with deterministic fixed costs of adjustment. Notes: see notes to Table 10 . 'Full Model-High AC' refers to a simulation, which is similar to 'Full Model-Baseline', but the upper adjustment cost factor,ξ, is quadrupled. 'RBC Model-High AC' is the analog of 'RBC Model-Baseline', again with quadrupled adjustment costs. Notes: see notes to Table 10 . 'Full Model-Det. AC' refers to a simulation, which is similar to 'Full Model-Baseline', but adjustment costs are deterministic. 'RBC Model-Det. AC' is the analog of 'RBC Model-Baseline', again with deterministic adjustment costs. Adjustment costs are again calibrated to match a weighted quadratic form in the skewness and kurtosis of the average investment rate distribution (see Section 3). The fluctuations of z in 'Full Model-Det. AC' have been rescaled to roughly match the volatility of output. 'RBC Model-Det. AC' uses the same rescaling factor.
